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A Wesleyan Voice in the Capitalist Jungle 
As the world continues to rapidly press toward the further integration of the 
global economy, the stakes get higher and higher, as evidenced by recent events in the 
United States and elsewhere. As a result, it is becoming increasingly prudent to focus on 
responsible economic policy and practice. Interestingly, although a variety of theological 
traditions have historically engaged with the theoretical foundations of capitalism, the 
Wesleyan tradition has been predominantly absent from these discussions.1 Granted, a 
number of Wesleyans have addressed John Wesley’s views on money (e.g., stewardship, 
materialism, helping the poor, etc.), but there are scarcely any attempts to engage 
Wesleyan thought with the theoretical underpinnings of capitalism.2  
One of the reasons for this absence could be the practical orientation of Protestant 
evangelical thought, both historically and in our present age. Diarmaid MacCulloch has 
concluded that for Christians who were engaged in social activism during Wesley’s time, 
                                                 
1
 In the early 1990’s, the Association of Christian Economists (ACE) in the United States published in its 
bi-annual journal, Faith and Economics, a series of survey articles on the implication of various theological 
traditions, both Protestant and Catholic, for economic thought. None of these articles was written from a 
Wesleyan standpoint. An examination of the table of contents for the just-published Oxford Handbook of 
Christianity and Economics reveals that Part B of this volume, entitled “Contemporary Theological 
Economics,” contains chapters on just about every Christian theological tradition except for the Wesleyan 
perspective. 
2
 An example of the former is the recent volume, How God Makes the World a Better Place: A Wesleyan 
Primer on Faith, Work, and Economic Transformation, by David Wright, with contributions by Rebecca 
Whitesel, Christin Taylor, Patrick Eby, and Keith Reeves, with a foreward by Jo Anne Lyon (Grand 
Rapids: Christian’s Library Press, 2012). 
2 
 
“it was politically safer to concentrate on voluntary organizations with specific practical 
focuses on obvious needs.”3 More recently, John G. Stackhouse, Jr., has observed “that 
North American evangelicals have generally tended to treat economic systems as if they 
were part of the climate or topography: realities simply to be dealt with as given, not as 
human constructs thus amenable to human revision.”4 Within the context of the Wesleyan 
tradition, this trend might very well have been reinforced by the practical inclination of 
John Wesley’s own ideas on economic matters. Manfred Marquardt has noted that 
Wesley had a “slight technical knowledge of economics” and that his “insight into the 
laws of economics and commerce” was limited in nature.5 This point has been supported 
by J. Wesley Bready, who stated that “Wesley never was a theorist; his economic 
principles were forged by the action of his religious faith, on the anvil of social 
experience.”6 
 What about those theological traditions that have been historically associated with 
some relatively well-defined perspectives on economic life? Bruce Webb has advanced 
the proposition that some of the alternative theological perspectives which can be found 
                                                 
3
 Diarmuid MacCulloch, Christianity: The First Three Thousand Years (New York: Viking, 2009), 748. 
4
 John G. Stackhouse, Jr., Evangelical Landscapes: Facing Critical Issues of the Day (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2002), 78. 
5
 Manfred Marquardt, John Wesley’s Social Ethics: Praxis and Principles (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 
1992), 47–8. 
6
 J. Wesley Bready, England: Before and After Wesley; The Evangelical Revival and Social Reform 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., 1938), 250. Robert Kingdon agreed with these arguments, writing 
that “Wesley’s economic thought combined traditional Christian moralism with a rather limited awareness 
of the economic problems of his day and of some of the possible ways the British government could deal 
with them.” At the same time, Kingdon also asserted that Wesley’s economic outlook was significantly 
influenced by the work of Josiah Tucker, a clergyman and economist whose views preceded those of Adam 
Smith. “In copying Tucker, Wesley adopted an approach to economics that was much more analytical, 
much more secular, and in the long run, much more fruitful than the one he had held heretofore.” Robert 
Kingdon, “Laissez-Faire or Government Control: A Problem for John Wesley.” Church History, 26:4 
(December 1957), 350–1. 
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among Christian economists “affect their views on how Christianity and economics ought 
to relate to each other.”7 He supported this contention by citing the following examples 
from the Protestant wing of the “Christianity and economics” literature: 
1) The Anabaptist approach. Jim Halteman has written that “the key factor that 
separates Anabaptist thinking from mainstream protestant thought” is “a two-
kingdom view of the Christian life.”8 In this approach, the community of faith 
is viewed as the primary venue for modeling Biblical values to the world, 
including the economic dimensions of life, as a way of providing a partial 
glimpse, at the present time, of the Kingdom of God that will be fully revealed 
in the fullness of time. By contrast, considerably less emphasis is placed on 
effects to influence and reform existing economic institutions and policies, in 
part because the “two-kingdom” paradigm stresses that all temporal structures 
outside the church are inherently flawed. Halteman went on to stress that 
Anabaptists do find both positive and negative elements in market capitalism. 
On the positive side, market-oriented societies tend to be “more tolerant of 
Christian practice than most alternative systems.” They also out-perform 
alternative models with respect to productivity and efficiency. On the negative 
side, Halteman identified problems such as the exaltation of individual 
freedom and interests at the expense of communal obligations and social 
                                                 
7
 Bruce G. Webb, “Whose Theology? Which Economics?” Faith and Economics, 23 (Spring, 1994), 46. 
8
 Jim Halteman, “An Anabaptist Approach to Economic Systems.” Faith and Economics, 16 (Fall, 1990), 
8. 
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needs, as well as “the way in which high productivity can foster excess and 
self-sufficiency.”9 
2) The Reformed approach, both in its “Kuyperian” (referring to Abraham 
Kuyper, the Dutch theologian, statesman, and public intellectual of the late 
19th century and early 20th century) and “Christian Reconstructionist” 
manifestations.10 Both of these orientations share an emphasis, as Webb 
describes it, on “bringing all economic institutions, practices, relationships, 
and indeed theories under the lordship of Jesus Christ.”11 This perspective 
stands in sharp contrast to the Anabaptist focus on modeling “kingdom 
values” within the church. However, Kuyperians and Christian 
Reconstructionists arrive at evaluations of market capitalism that are quite 
different from one another, despite their common theological starting point. 
Roland Hoksbergen has concluded that Kuyperian analysis of the existing 
institutions of market capitalism, as well as the neoclassical framework of 
                                                 
9
 Ibid., 10. Professor Halteman also authored the chapter on “Anabaptist Approaches to Economics” in the 
aforementioned, and recently released, Oxford Handbook on Christianity and Economics (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2014). 
10
 Some readers might question the inclusion of Christian Reconstructionist ideas in this review, agreeing 
with the conclusion of Michelle Goldberg that this theological perspective “is controversial even among 
Christian conservatives.” However, the authors have taken the position, similar to Goldberg’s, that some of 
the political thinking which stems from Reconstructionist theology “has been hugely influential in the 
broader evangelical movement.” Kingdom Coming: The Rise of Christian Nationalism (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 2006), 13. There is also a distinct chapter, authored by Edd Noell entitled, “Theonomy and 
Economic Institutions,” in the Oxford Handbook of Christianity and Economics. A more moderate 
expression of an economically “conservative” interpretation of Reformed theology has been provided by 
David W. Hall and Matthew D. Burton in their “Five Points of Economic Calvinism”: 1) The inequality of 
wealth is an enduring dynamic and must be accepted; 2) God made us to be creators, developers, and 
entrepreneurs; 3) Because of sin, accountability and incentives will always be needed; 4) Personal freedom 
(or non-interference from outside hierarchies) is necessary for business to thrive; and 5) Profit is 
commended in order to provide more for others. Calvin and Commerce: The Transforming Power of 
Calvinism in Market Economies (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing, 2009), 214–5. 
11
 Webb, 48. 
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economic theory, has found them both to be seriously wanting, ironically for 
many of the same reasons that are emphasized by Anabaptist commentators.12 
In fact, the Kuyperian critique of market forces, in some respects, seems to be 
deeper and more intense than the Anabaptist criticisms, perhaps, in part, due 
to the higher level of expectations that Reformed Christians might have for the 
existing institutions of contemporary society. By contrast, Reconstructionist 
thinkers are much more supportive of market capitalism in theory, provided 
that it is governed by a legal and regulatory framework that is consistent with 
Biblical “blueprints,” particularly those which can be derived from Old 
Testament law. Edd Noell has observed that Reconstructionists find that 
applications of Biblical law, in diverse areas such as monetary affairs, private 
property, pollution, debt, labor, economic growth, taxes, and charity, “not 
only are compatible with capitalism but provide the necessary structural 
foundations of a capitalist system.”13 Both Hoksbergen and Noell insist that 
while both these strains of Reformed theology are critical of the assumptions 
and methodologies that underlie “secular” economic thinking, they find some 
theoretical perspectives more acceptable than others. While Kuyperians lean 
in the direction of institutionalist and post-Keynesian theories which place 
considerably less confidence in the efficiency and stability of market 
processes, Reconstructionists prefer the Austrian approach, which largely 
                                                 
12
 Roland Hoksbergen, “A Reformed Approach to Economics: The Kuyperian Tradition.” Faith and 
Economics, 20 (Fall, 1992), 14. An expanded treatment of this perspective can be found in the chapter 
entitled, “Reformed Christian Economics,” written by Bob Goudzwaard and Roel Jongeneel, in the Oxford 
Handbook on Christianity and Economics. 
13
 Edd S. Noell, “A Reformed Approach to Economics: Christian Reconstructionism.” Faith and 
Economics, 21 (Spring, 1993), 13. 
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eschews the mathematical and statistical methodologies that are associated 
with neoclassical analysis. 
 
The Compatibility of Capitalism and Wesleyan Thought 
Apart from the separate question of whether or not Adam Smith, the oft-described 
founder of modern economics, was the possessor of a personal Christian faith, his 
thought was certainly influenced by the Reformed theology of 18th-century Scotland, 
particularly the Moderate faction within the Presbyterian church which was well-
represented during the Scottish Enlightenment, in which Smith was a major participant.14 
Richard B. Sher has separated what he describes as “Moderate moral teaching and 
preaching” into two distinct categories: Christian Stoicism, or “private virtue,” and Whig-
Presbyterian conservatism, or “public virtue.”15 With respect to the former, Paul 
Oslington has observed that Christianity and Stoicism were “historically intertwined” 
during the period of the Scottish Enlightenment, and that many scholars rush to a 
premature judgment in concluding that unleavened Stoicism was the overarching 
influence on Smith’s ethical system.16 Oslington also calls attention to a passage in The 
                                                 
14
 Paul Oslington, “God and the Market: Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand.” Journal of Business Ethics, 108:4 
(July 2012), 431. Oslington has also contended that “there must be a presumption of an important 
theological background to any work of moral philosophy or political economy produced in eighteenth-
century Scotland,” since the culture of the country, at that time in history, “was dominated by the 
Presbyterian Kirk in a way that those of us living in contemporary secular societies find difficult to 
appreciate.” Paul Oslington, “The Future Hope in Adam Smith’s System.” Studies in Christian Ethics, 24:3 
(August 2011), 330–1. As an aside, Professor Oslington is the editor of the aforementioned Oxford 
Handbook of Christianity and Economics. 
15
 Richard B. Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati of 
Edinburgh (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 187–212. 
16
 As an example of this perspective, Oslington cites an article by Harold B. Jones, “Marcus Aurelius, the 
Stoic Ethic, and Adam Smith.” Journal of Business Ethics, 95:1 (August 2010), 89–96. David Raphael and 
Alec Macfie also state, on page 5 of their Introduction to the 1976 edition of Smith’s Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, that “Stoic philosophy is the primary influence on Smith’s ethical thought.” 
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Theory of Moral Sentiments where Smith himself drew a distinction between the 
principles of the Stoic world-view and the values associated with what he referred to as 
“Nature.” In this section, Smith maintains that some of the “consolations” which Nature 
provides, in the face of “the most unfortunate and disastrous” events of life, emanate 
“from a firm reliance upon, and a reverential submission to, that benevolent wisdom 
which directs all the events of human life,” and not just from the internal deliberations of 
what Smith refers to as “the impartial spectator” or “the man within the breast.”17 Smith 
goes on to assert that while “Nature has not prescribed to us this sublime contemplation 
(the considerations of the man within the breast) as the great business and occupation of 
our lives,” this is precisely the goal at which Stoic philosophy is directed.18 The end 
result of this world-view, according to Smith, is a “perfect apathy” which “endeavours to 
render us altogether indifferent and unconcerned in the success or miscarriage of 
everything which Nature has prescribed to us as the proper business and occupation of 
our lives.”19 
Smith not only rejected Stoic apathy, he was closely allied with his friend, David 
Hume, in asserting that morality and conscience are rooted in sympathy. According to 
Hume, moral judgment requires reason to assess the “tendency of qualities and actions, 
and point out their beneficial consequences to society and to their possessor.” This 
reasoning must be supported by an underlying sentiment to promote the happiness of 
                                                 
17
 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982), 292. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid., 292–3. 
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humanity and reduce its misery.20 Consequently, “sympathy is the chief source of moral 
distinctions.” Indeed, it is the sole means by which we are affected by the happiness of 
others. It is the source of moral approbation.21 Nevertheless, for Hume our affections play 
a much greater role in sympathy than does our reason. This is reflected in his famous 
dictum that reason is always a slave to the passions. In effect, “morality . . . is more 
properly felt than judged of.”22 Morality is based on sentiment, because human 
psychology in general is based on sentiment. The ultimate ends of human action are 
ultimately determined by sentiment, not the intellectual faculties.23 
Smith likewise based conscience on sympathy, but his construal recognizes a 
more active role for reason. Agreeing with Hume, he believed that moral approbation and 
disapprobation stem from sympathy. We approve or disapprove the behavior of others 
inasmuch as we can or cannot sympathize with the “sentiments and motives which 
directed it.” In the same way, we approve or disapprove our own conduct to the extent 
that we can or cannot view ourselves from the perspective of others and still sympathize 
with our own sentiments and motives.24 Smith believed that we want to be praiseworthy 
from an impartial perspective, for we naturally desire the praise of individuals.25 
Essentially, conscience is only as strong as the feeling of sympathy which supports it. If 
we are to properly judge between our interests and the interests of those with whom we 
have no particular connection, we must be able to assess the situation from the 
                                                 
20
 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp, Appendix 1 
(Oxford: Oxford, 1998), 157–8. 
21
 David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, §3.3.6 (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1992), 618–9. 
22
 Ibid., §3.1.2, 470. 
23
 Hume, Enquiry, Appendix 1, 162. 
24
 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, §3.1 (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2000), 161. 
25
 Ibid., §3.2, 166–7. 
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perspective of an impartial third party.26 Granted, our passions can often deceive us, but 
this can be overcome if we will observe the behavior of others when forming our general 
rules of conduct.27 Smith concluded, 
The man of the most perfect virtue, the man whom we naturally love and 
revere the most, is he who joins, to the most perfect command of his own 
original and selfish feelings, the most exquisite sensibility both to the 
original and sympathetic feelings of others.28 
The question that still lingers regarding Smith’s theories is whether sympathy is 
strong enough to counter the selfish excesses engendered by an economic system that is 
driven by self-interest. In order to engage capitalism with Wesleyan thought, it will first 
be necessary to examine how self-interest and sympathy are understood within a 
Wesleyan framework. 
Suggesting a Wesleyan interpretation of self-love is somewhat sticky, since 
Wesley himself equivocated when he discussed self-love. Initially, Wesley viewed self-
love rather negatively, seeing it as something to be conquered. He believed that Christian 
perfection frees us of self-will such that the perfect do not even desire relief from their 
pain. Consequently, Thomas Church accused Wesley of espousing “a stoical 
insensibility” carried to “the very height of extravagance and presumption.”29 Wesley 
even went so far as to omit self-interest as a part of the happiness that believers have in 
God.30 
                                                 
26
 Ibid., §3.2, 192. 
27
 Ibid., §3.4, 221–4. 
28
 Ibid., §3.3, 214. 
29
 O. S. Walters, “John Wesley’s Footnotes to Christian Perfection,” Methodist History 12, no. 1 (1973),22. 
30
 Wesley, Sermon 26, “Upon Our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, Discourse VI,” §2.2, The Works of John 
Wesley [Begun as The Oxford Edition of the Works of John Wesley, Oxford: Clarendon, 1975–83. 
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Nevertheless, Wesley later revised his position to one that reflects a more positive 
view of self-love. For instance, he claimed that when love is present, happiness and virtue 
are in harmony with one another.31 Assertions like this led Albert Outler to eventually 
view Wesley’s ethics as eudemonistic. He suggested that Wesley’s “emphases on duty 
and discipline are auxiliary to his main concern for human happiness.”32  
It seems that the key for Wesley is the need for love to be free of self-will. This 
does not mean that love must transcend self-love. Rather, narrow self-interest cannot be 
the chief motivating factor in love. Wesley seems to follow the Aristotelian notion that 
virtue aims at the chief good, except for Wesley the chief good is God himself, not 
happiness. The morality of self-love can be judged by the extent to which it either draws 
us closer to God or pushes us farther away. 
It can certainly be argued that Wesley never gave the topic of self-love the 
attention it should have received, given the importance that love holds in his thought.33 
Therefore, evaluating self-love and self-interest from a Wesleyan perspective will require 
us to place it in its broader theological context. Mildred Bangs Wynkoop argues that self-
interest has a legitimate place in Wesleyan ethics, for both self-interest and other-interest 
are “absolutely essential to mental health.” As such, self-love is only sinful when it 
crowds out “other selves.”34 Outler agrees, asserting that both self-loathing and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Continued as The Bicentennial Edition of the Works of John Wesley”], (Nashville: Abingdon, 1984–. ), 
1:576 [Jackson ed., 5:331]. 
31
 Wesley, “An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion,” §3, WW, 11:45 [J 8:3]. 
32
 Albert C. Outler, Theology in the Wesleyan Spirit ( Nashville: Tidings, 1975), 81. 
33
 John B. Cobb, Grace and Responsibility: A Wesleyan Theology for Today ( Nashville: Abingdon, 1995), 
67–8. 
34
 Mildred Bangs Wynkoop, A Theology of Love: The Dynamic of Wesleyanism (Kansas City: Beacon Hill, 
1972), 203. 
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narcissism should be avoided, since they corrupt the relationships that we have with 
others.35 
Indeed, Wesley recognized the need to limit self-love and place it in proper 
perspective, for he believed that arrogance is pervasive and morally destructive. As a 
matter of fact, he condemned both the skeptics and the enthusiasts for their pride.36 
However, rather than view self-love as something that should be eliminated, Wesley 
believed that love for God and love for others is ultimately what prevents “pride, vanity, 
and self-will” from tainting our words and actions.37 Love and humility are what keep 
self-interest in check. Consequently, a Wesleyan schema can allow the pursuit of self-
interest so long as love for God, love for others, and humility are cultivated. 
Let us recall that according to Smith’s conception of capitalism, sympathy is 
integral to keeping self-interest in check. From a twenty-first century perspective, it is 
also necessary to counterbalance the disparities created by large scale capitalistic 
economies. In a Wesleyan schema, since sympathy is connected with love for God, love 
for others, and humility, sympathy is best understood within the intersection of these 
three elements of Wesleyan virtue ethics. Sympathy relates to love for God in the sense 
that loving God entails loving as God loves, reflecting the divine image in the way that 
we love. God loves all of his creation, and because it is important to him, it is important 
to us. Love for God certainly includes sympathy and compassion for the hurting and 
downtrodden. 
                                                 
35
 Outler, 83. 
36
 Wallace G. Gray, “The Place of Reason in the Theology of John Wesley” (Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt 
University, 1953), 216. 
37
 Wesley, “An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion,” §51, WW, 11:64 [J 8:20]. 
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Sympathy obviously is related to love for others, for it is an essential part of 
loving others. Of course, it is possible to love others in a way that cares about their well-
being while remaining relatively indifferent to their pain and suffering. In fact, Wesley 
felt that the rich tend to be unsympathetic toward the poor, even though they may actually 
care about the poor more generally. He attributed this to voluntary ignorance. In other 
words, we will be indifferent and unsympathetic to the plight of others if we are unaware 
of their pain.38 The upshot of this is that cultivating love for others in general will not 
necessarily foster sympathy. We must cultivate sympathy separately. 
Humility is also related to sympathy, for humility requires a certain degree of 
respect for the other. It is difficult (if not impossible) to feel sorry for others while we sit 
in judgment over them. Sympathy requires a type of reciprocity in which we regard 
others as important as us. We must be able to see ourselves in the circumstances of others 
before we can sympathize with them, and this hypothetical substitution requires a certain 
degree of parity and reciprocity. Consequently, humility is an essential part of sympathy. 
To summarize, Wesleyan thought does not portray self-interest or self-love as 
inherently good or evil. Its morality lies in the way it is pursued and in its relationship to 
love for God and love for others. Love for God must always be supreme, and even though 
we may otherwise love people and things for their own sake, everything must ultimately 
be loved for God’s sake. In other words, we can pursue our self-interest in a capitalist 
economy as long as: 1) our ultimate interest is to glorify God in all we think and do and 
2) our interest is to promote the happiness and well-being of others equally with our own 
happiness and well-being. 
                                                 
38
 Wesley, Sermon 98, “On Visiting the Sick,” §1.3, WW, 3:387–8 [J 7:119]. 
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Nevertheless, a Wesleyan understanding of self-interest also demands that we 
tread cautiously, because even though self-interest is legitimate in its own right, it 
contains the seeds of selfishness and sin. Wesley even felt that Christianity contains the 
seeds of its own possible destruction, because it stresses industriousness, and this 
produces wealth, which ultimately threatens vital Christian faith. This is why he insisted 
that after we gain all we can and save all we can, we must give all we can.39 
 
Elements of Wesleyan Theology Most Relevant to Capitalism 
In order to justify this interpretation of a Wesleyan view of self-interest, it will be 
necessary to situate it within the broader context of Wesleyan theology. There are two 
areas of rapprochement that seem most relevant to this task. First, our view of self-
interest must cohere with a Wesleyan understanding of divine grace and providence. At 
first blush this may appear to be problematic, since there has always been a division 
between those that emphasize God’s work through supernatural intervention and those 
that emphasize God’s work through natural processes. Although Wesley’s writings are 
open to interpretation with regard to the transformation of the individual, they are much 
clearer otherwise. Although some people in the Wesleyan tradition seem to view God as 
the micromanager of the universe, Wesley himself did not hold such a view. This is 
reflected in his sermon, “The Nature of Enthusiasm”, which includes a stern warning 
against looking for “extraordinary” help from God and trusting in sudden feelings and 
impulses.40 
                                                 
39
 Wesley, Sermon 122, “Causes of the Inefficacy of Christianity”, §§17–18, WW, 4:95–6 [J 7:290]. 
40
 Wesley, Sermon 37, “The Nature of Enthusiasm”, WW, 2:46–60 [J 5:467–78]. 
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Consequently, in judging the aptness of participating in capitalist economics, it is 
safe to say that a Wesleyan view of divine providence stresses our responsibility in 
economic matters. It does not accept the view that economic outcomes are preordained of 
God and thus cannot really be altered by our actions. Instead, the responsibility of acting 
ethically and wisely falls upon our shoulders. We should turn to God for help but not 
expect God to necessarily alter the course of events to the extent of obviating our 
responsibility. Seeking financial prosperity is morally acceptable as long as we accept the 
responsibility that comes with wealth. 
The second area of Wesleyan theology relevant to justifying this view of self-
interest is its understanding of and emphasis on love as the core of Christian spirituality 
and ethics. To be specific, does centering one’s theology on the Love Commandments 
preclude or qualify the pursuit of self-interest in any way? We have already noted how 
Wesleyan theology recognizes the naturalness and legitimacy of self-interest yet demands 
that self-interest be kept in check and in proper perspective. This view is characterized by 
Gene Outka as “self-love as normal, reasonable, prudent”. It is the belief that self-love 
can serve as the template for loving others. We treat others as we want to be treated by 
them.41 
However, Christian love is not limited to mere reciprocity, for it also requires us 
to love God and others sacrificially. Because Wesleyan theology places the Love 
Commandments at the center of Christian spirituality and ethics, it teaches that self-
giving, sacrificial love is to be normative in the Christian life. Sacrifice is not viewed as a 
work of supererogation. Nevertheless, sacrifice is not normative to the extent of 
                                                 
41
 Outka, Gene. Agape: An Ethical Analysis (New Haven: Yale University, 1972), 63–7. 
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eliminating or always overriding self-interest, for self-interest is necessary for our own 
preservation, health, and happiness. It also serves as a template to guide us in loving 
others, as was mentioned earlier. Moreover, it helps keep the self-interest of others in 
check, and to the extent that a balance between everyone’s individual self-interest is 
maintained, selfishness will be held at bay. Self-giving should never be stressed to the 
point of enabling selfish or abusive behavior. 
The real issue is not self-interest per se, but whether self-interest is excessive, and 
this is determined by comparing our self-interest with our concern for others. As Joseph 
Butler observed in his writings, it is not that we love ourselves too much but that we love 
others too little. Consequently, rather than try to quell self-interest, it should be our goal 
to take a greater interest in the happiness and well-being of others. The pursuit of self-
interest in the free market can be good if we are also pursuing and promoting the interests 
of others, especially those with the greatest need. 
 
Toward a Wesleyan Approach to Free Market Economics 
Adam Smith believed that the ethical practice of capitalism is dependent upon the 
sympathy that citizens and market participants have for one another. It is apparent 
sympathy is likewise crucial to a Wesleyan approach to free market economics, for it is 
through sympathy that our self-interest becomes attached to the interests and well-being 
of others. Sympathy is the key to allowing self-love serve as a template for our love of 
others. Their pleasure and pain become our own. 
The challenge is to cultivate sympathy, most particularly within the body of 
Christ. The question is whether there is anything distinctive about viewing sympathy 
16 
 
through a Wesleyan theological lens. Hume suggested that sympathy comes to us 
naturally (in a healthy brain, that is), and there is a growing body of scientific evidence to 
confirm this not only in human behavior, but also in animals with more highly developed 
brains, especially higher primates.42 Fortunately, Wesley had the wisdom to embrace our 
natural abilities through his doctrine of prevenient grace. He understood that although we 
are basically selfish, there is still great potential within each person for the development 
and cultivation of natural virtues, including sympathy. This more balanced view of 
human nature is being increasingly confirmed through social science and expressed 
through fields of study like sociobiology. 
For Hume, the attempt to cultivate sympathy through reasoning is somewhat 
futile, since he claimed that reason is always a slave to the passions. In contrast, Wesley 
did not regard reason so subserviently. The Wesleyan understanding of sympathy is more 
cognitive, based on value judgments. Even though sympathy itself may be instinctive, it 
is ultimately shaped by reason and can be scrutinized by reason. We have already noted 
two factors in cultivating sympathy that Wesley himself acknowledged. First, we can 
promote sympathy through exposure. Sympathy is driven by our personal experiences 
and by our witnessing the need and suffering of others. Simply stated, we can only 
sympathize with that of which we are aware. Second, sympathy can be fostered by 
nurturing humility, and this should be done in a way consistent with our understanding of 
the relationship between self-love and love for others. Once again, the goal is not to love 
ourselves less but to love others more. Along those same lines, humility should not be 
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understood as self-abasement. Instead, humility entails recognizing the importance of 
others, seeing them at least as important as we see ourselves. 
We can also promote sympathy through moral exemplars. It is both humbling and 
inspiring to see great people give of themselves to others through humility, not in a 
condescending way, but in a way that recognizes the dignity of the other, expressing both 
love and respect. In effect, this suggests that sympathy can be cultivated like a moral 
virtue, learned and honed through example and practice. One might even argue that this is 
the best (if not the only) way to cultivate sympathy. Sympathy requires us to connect our 
experiences with the experiences of others. We assume that to the extent our experiences 
are similar, our feelings will likewise be similar. Since feelings are somewhat subjective, 
sympathy is also a bit subjective. This makes it difficult to describe and learn through 
abstract principles, at least for the non-philosopher. Learning by example seems to be the 
simplest and most effective way to cultivate sympathy among the populace. In the end, 
perhaps sympathy should be regarded as a moral virtue, one that is central to Wesleyan 
virtue ethics. 
The final question to raise is whether Wesleyan thought offers any practical 
insights on the practice of free market capitalism. Joseph Schumpeter famously observed 
that “this process of Creative Destruction (capitalization in the original) is the essential 
fact about capitalism.”43 Schumpeter used this phrase in order to illustrate the dynamic 
characteristics of a market economy: new products and processes are always being 
developed, which render older goods and procedures less useful or even obsolete. One of 
the reasons why it has been historically difficult to categorize the implications of 
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Wesleyan theology for economic life is that Wesley himself affirmed at least some 
aspects of the creative dimension of market forces, such as work and saving, while 
retaining a strong concern for those who were most affected by the destructive side of 
these changes.  
A good example of what J. Wesley Bready described as Wesley’s “economic 
realism” is his perspective on food prices during the Industrial Revolution, which was of 
immediate concern to the poor.44 In some cases, Wesley opposed higher taxes on 
imported food, because that would raise food prices for the poor.45 In other cases, he 
supported government interventions that he thought would contribute to lower food 
prices.46 For Wesley, his emphasis on practical approaches to economic problems appears 
to have led him to affirm the results of market processes of voluntary exchange in cases 
where the results appeared to advance his moral objectives, and to argue for limitations 
on market forces in situations where this did not appear to be the case, at least in the short 
run.
47
 By doing so, Wesley might very well constitute an example of what David 
Henderson, the former chief economist for the Organization for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (OECD) has characterized in more recent times as “do-it-yourself 
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economics,” comprised of judgments, especially with respect to processes and not 
outcomes, that are “largely intuitive” in nature.48 
Perhaps the takeaway from this analysis is that the distinctiveness that Wesleyan 
thought brings to capitalism is more a matter of emphasis than it is a matter of form or 
detail. In any event, as Wesleyan thought continues to engage with the social sciences, a 
number of opportunities become available to us. Psychology, sociology, economics, 
political science, etc. could all use more Wesleyan voices, and Wesleyan thought will be 
enriched by engaging with these disciplines. 
 
                                                 
48
 David Henderson, Anti-Liberalism 2000: The Rise of New Millennium Collectivism (London: Institute of 
Economic Affairs, 2001), 14. 
